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THE PURPOSE OF THIS UPDATE
At the President’s urging, the first and mostprominent item on the legislative agenda for thisyear is Social Security reform. Social Security is
of vital importance both in its own right, and because it
has substantial impact on the nation’s overall fiscal pol-
icy. CED is concerned today that a misguided approach
to Social Security restructuring might not only endanger
the accomplishments of that program, but also miss an
important opportunity to turn the nation’s fiscal policy
back in the right direction. Such an approach could even
do still further damage to our financial standing at home
and in the international marketplace. In short, Social
Security legislation could make or break the nation’s
essential safety net, and the budget. 
CED issued a report, Fixing Social Security, in 1997, and
we believe that the principles and policy recommenda-
tions are as pertinent today as they were then. This brief
statement explains why that proposal remains highly rel-
evant today, in terms of both fiscal policy and retirement
policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Like most Americans, we believe that SocialSecurity, more formally known as Federal Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance
(OASDI), is one of the most successful social programs
in U.S. history. The basic objective of Social Security—
to protect the economic security of retirees—is sound,
and the nation must not falter in its commitment to it.
Social Security also provides an important safety net
for survivors of younger workers, and for the disabled,
saving their families from severe financial distress. It
provides financial security for those who live very long
lives, with inflation protection that is virtually impos-
sible to obtain from the private sector. The decline in
poverty rates for the elderly is strong evidence of the
overall beneficial effects of this program. Social
Security fulfills all of these functions at minuscule
administrative cost. These virtues must be preserved
through any proposed reform.
Still, because of the challenge posed by the aging of
the U.S. population, substantial change in the Social
Security system is inevitable. When the baby-boom
generation begins to retire, the system’s current oper-
ating surplus will begin to decline, after which the
trust fund balances will be drawn down at a rapid
rate. If no action is taken, the system will be forced to
impose a very large, inequitable and economically
inefficient increase in the tax burden on future work-
ers, and/or sharp and disruptive cuts in benefits, in an
approximate range of from 2018 (the time when
Social Security tax revenues fall short of benefits,
according to the Social Security actuary) to 2052
(when the Social Security Trust Fund is exhausted,
according to the Congressional Budget Office). But the
problems of the system should not be exaggerated;
under current economic and demographic assump-
tions, and with no additional sources of revenue,
Social Security can continue to pay somewhere in an
estimated range of from about 73 percent (according
to the Social Security actuary) to about 78 percent
(according to the Congressional Budget Office) of cur-
rently promised benefits in perpetuity.
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CRITERIA FOR REFORM
Given the Social Security funding shortfall,reform will be a collection of unpleasantsteps, chosen to minimize the overall pain.
Even in instances where the goal of reform is to
improve some aspect (such as the balance of relative
benefits across generations) of the current system,
progress will be constrained by the actuarial deficit in
the system. Agreement on the fundamental objectives
of Social Security and its relation to the broader issue
of national retirement policy would help the nation to
spread the discomfort fairly across the population.
Considering the important role that Social Security
plays in our society, CED recommends the following
criteria for evaluating proposed changes in the system.
■ Social Security should provide a minimum retire-
ment income—that is, a safety net—for all workers
and their families. The lack of an adequate retire-
ment foundation would result in hardship among
the population (especially those with persistent low
incomes or who suffer economic setbacks), and
persuasive demands for relief through other federal,
state, and local programs, which would be less
equitable, more administratively costly, and
demeaning to the elderly.
■ The Social Security benefit structure should retain
an element of progressivity, whereby the ratio of
benefits to contributions is higher for lower-income
workers.
■ Participation in the Social Security system by work-
ers should be universal, because the burden of
supporting the redistribution and insurance ele-
ments of Social Security should be shared as
broadly as possible.
■ Social Security reform should strive for greater
equity between generations and for better returns
on contributions than the present system will pro-
vide for future retirees. When the program’s
funding runs short a few decades from now, future
workers and retirees will face higher taxes or lower
benefits, or both; and some privatization plans
would in effect burden those workers with funding
both their own retirements and those of the baby-
boom generation. Hiding such burdens through
massive borrowing would do those younger and
future workers no favor. Timely reform should aim
to minimize this inequity through increased saving
and investment, and also through higher returns for
younger and future workers.
■ Reform should also seek greater equity among cur-
rent participants, particularly between workers with
nonworking spouses and other retirees.
■ A fundamental objective of Social Security reform is
to increase national saving, so that the burden of
supporting rising numbers of elderly is made less
onerous by more rapid capital accumulation and
economic growth. 
■ Social Security reform should not derail the critical
economic objective of eliminating deficits in the
federal budget. With deficits far too large and with
prospects for sufficient improvement dim, Social
Security reforms should reduce, not increase,
deficits and borrowing in the coming years. (CED
also advocated improvements in the federal budget
process to ensure that these budget savings are pro-
tected, and not immediately spent. See Exploding
Deficits, Declining Growth: The Federal Budget and the
Aging of America, Committee for Economic
Development, March 2003.)
■ Reform measures should minimize disincentives for
labor force participation by the elderly, and encour-
age private saving. 
■ Changes that have a continuing positive effect on
the system’s actuarial balance and provide auto-
matic responses to changed circumstances (such as
a larger-than-anticipated increase in life expectancy)
are preferable to one-time changes that merely
postpone insolvency.
■ Reform measures should be administratively feasible,
should not raise administrative costs significantly,
and every effort should be made to minimize costs
arising from investments in private assets.
■ Changes in Social Security benefits should be
enacted promptly and phased in gradually. Those in
or close to retirement must be protected. Current
workers need reasonably accurate information con-
cerning expected Social Security income in order to
make informed decisions about retirement saving
and retirement age, and they require adequate lead
time to plan and adjust their behavior to any
changes in the system.
Of course, no reform proposal can fully satisfy all
these criteria, because there are unavoidable tradeoffs.
For example, cuts in benefits would be likely to
increase both public and private saving, but would
also reduce the economic security of retirees.
To balance these tradeoffs, CED believes that Social
Security should be divided into two components: (1) a
defined benefit that includes both a safety net for low-
income and disabled workers and survivors, and
insurance against the loss of retirement income; and
(2) a mandatory personal retirement account (PRA),
which provides retirement benefits from contributions
accumulated in the account. Such a dual system
would satisfy most of the reform criteria favored by
CED, as explained below. 
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SUMMARY OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Reforming the Existing System 
With respect to the existing defined benefit,the CED reform program would gradu-ally phase in changes in the Social
Security system and thereby avoid serious disruptions
in labor markets and in the lives of retirees. It would
protect the economic security of lower-income
retirees, and over time further reduce poverty among
the elderly. It would achieve the fairest possible bal-
ance of burdens across generations. Present retirees
and older workers would experience little or no
change in benefits from the existing system (though
the portion of benefits subject to taxation would rise
for some). The particular policy steps enumerated
below would both eliminate Social Security’s 75-year
actuarial shortfall, and reduce inequities between
retired married couples with non-working spouses
and other retirees.
■ Reduce the Growth in Initial Benefits. CED’s
plan would reduce the system’s costs by gradually
reducing initial benefits for new upper- and mid-
dle-income retirees, but not for low-wage workers.
(This step would have no effect on current retirees).
Technically speaking, the most direct and equitable
way gradually to trim the growth of prospective
benefits is to reduce the growth in the primary
insurance amount (PIA), which is the first-year
benefit received by an individual who retires at the
normal retirement age (NRA). CED’s plan would
gradually reduce replacement rates for the two
higher-wage brackets in the PIA formula, thereby
reducing the growth of future benefits in the exist-
ing defined benefit program for middle- and
upper-income participants, but not for low-wage
workers.
The growth of initial benefits would be reduced
further by increasing the number of years of wages
included in the PIA formula from 35 to 40 years.
Currently, those who contribute for only 35 years
are eligible for benefits as high as for those who
contribute for a longer period.
■ Reduce the Growth in Lifetime Benefits by
Raising the Normal Retirement Age. The nor-
mal retirement age long remained at 65, without
adjustment to compensate for the large increase in
life spans in the last half century. This raised the
cost of Social Security dramatically. In 1983,
Congress enacted legislation providing for a gradual
increase in the NRA to 67, which only partially off-
sets the rise in average life spans. To further
compensate for past and expected increases in life
expectancy, CED’s plan would raise the normal
retirement age by two months per year until it
reaches 70 years. Thereafter, the NRA would rise in
line with increases in life expectancy. The earliest
eligibility age, currently 62 years, would be
increased to 65 over the same period and subse-
quently similarly indexed.
■ Tax Social Security Benefits. CED recommends
that the income tax apply to all Social Security ben-
efits in excess of the contributions made by the
worker. (This result would be approximated by tax-
ing 85 percent of benefits for all workers. Taxation
of benefits derived from a worker’s own contribu-
tions would constitute double taxation.)  With this
change, Social Security would be taxed like other
contributory programs. Low-income recipients
would not be affected because they are exempted
from income taxation through the personal exemp-
tion that is available to all potential taxpayers, and
a special higher standard deduction for the elderly.
■ Reduce Spousal Benefits. At present, a spouse
is entitled to a retirement benefit equal to his or her
own benefit or 50 percent of the other spouse’s
benefit, whichever is higher. Consequently, the rate
of return on contributions is much higher for cou-
ples with a nonworking spouse than for others. To
reduce costs and to improve equity between work-
ing and nonworking spouses, CED recommends
that retirement benefits for the nonworking partner
of a retired couple be reduced gradually until they
reach 33 percent of the worker’s PIA. CED does not
recommend any reduction in the non-worker’s sur-
vivor benefits, which may be as high as 100 percent
of the worker’s PIA.
■ Expand Coverage to Include State and Local
Employees. The Social Security system redistrib-
utes income from high-income retirees to
low-income retirees. CED favors continuation of a
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redistribution element in the Social Security pro-
gram. However, CED believes that as a matter of
equity, the burden of redistribution must be widely
shared, and therefore that coverage should be uni-
versal. Consequently, CED recommends that all
new state and local employees be required to
become participants in the Social Security system,
and that current employees be permitted to join
Social Security on a voluntary basis. 
The CED proposal builds in a margin for projection
error. The policy proposals were selected in 1997 to
over-achieve 75-year solvency for the program, with a
safety margin of more than one third of the then-
measured deficit. Thus, enactment of the CED reforms
could result in a substantial long-run surplus in the
retirement program. Consequently, if experience con-
firms this projection, it may eventually be possible to
terminate the phase-in of further cuts in benefits, or to
reduce payroll tax contributions.
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CED believes that all employees and employersshould be required to contribute to personalretirement accounts (PRAs). CED believes that
the PRA system should be an “add-on” to the current
system. Payroll tax revenues should not be “carved
out” and contributed to private accounts, because
existing payroll taxes are needed to finance benefits
even under the reformed and newly solvent Social
Security program, which would maintain the basic
safety net. We believe that so-called “carve out” pro-
posals, which divert payroll taxes to private accounts,
would increase the budget deficit dangerously.
The PRAs favored by CED would have the following
characteristics:
■ PRAs would be funded by mandatory contributions
totaling 3.0 percent of covered payroll, with pay-
ments split equally between employees and
employers. (The self-employed would contribute
the entire 3.0 percent of covered payroll.)
■ PRAs would be owned by individuals and directed
by them. Contributions could be invested only in a
limited number of broad-based funds that hold pri-
vate-sector financial securities.
■ Contributions to PRAs would receive tax-preferred
treatment similar to that accorded to 401(k)s.
Individual and employer contributions would be
made from before-tax income, and earnings would
accumulate on a tax-deferred basis. Individuals would
pay taxes only on future benefits derived from PRAs.
■ The accumulated balances in PRAs would be part
of the estates of deceased workers in the event of
death before retirement.
■ We recognize that some mandated business partici-
pants and their employees, as well as many
self-employed, do not have hands-on experience
with retirement saving accounts. Therefore, to pro-
tect these groups, special rules for PRAs will be
needed to assure appropriate communications, pru-
dent investment alternatives, reasonable fees, and
preservation of funds for retirement. In providing
appropriate safeguards for PRAs, maximum use
should be made of existing regulations governing
private pensions and 401(k) and IRA saving plans
(revised as needed) to minimize the need for new
regulatory or supervisory bodies.
■ To assure that PRAs would be used for their specific
intended purpose—to provide retirement income
for the full lifetimes of the participant and spouse—
CED favors rules applicable to PRAs that (1)
prohibit withdrawals or borrowing of PRA funds
before retirement, and (2) ensure that funds are
withdrawn gradually over the life of the participant
after retirement. (This would occur, for example, if
PRA fund balances were annuitized at retirement.)
Employers that already manage pension funds for
their employees may find it necessary to create sep-
arate “side-car” accounts for PRA contributions to
comply with the additional restrictions applicable
only to PRAs.
The PRAs would also generate a sizable increase in
private (and national) saving. Of course, some individ-
uals and businesses will finance contributions to PRAs
by reducing present contributions to private pensions,
401(k)s, etc. To the extent that this form of substitu-
tion occurs, there will be less increase in private
The Second Tier: Personal Retirement Accounts
saving, labor costs will be unaffected by PRA contribu-
tions, and retirement saving created by PRAs will be
partially offset. Moreover, if tax-sheltered PRAs are
substituted for saving that is not entitled to tax prefer-
ence, federal revenues would be reduced, thereby
offsetting some of the improvement in private saving.
However, a large number of workers, including most
contingent and part-time workers, are not currently
covered by discretionary employer retirement plans,
and many workers have little or no personal savings to
shift into the new PRAs. For those with little or no
saving, the creation of mandatory PRAs will undoubt-
edly generate a large increase in saving. Furthermore,
for some, the experience of owning such assets may
encourage additional saving.
The creation of PRAs will help to restore the confi-
dence of young people in the Social Security system
by offering an opportunity for a higher return on con-
tributions and giving workers a sense of ownership.
Although contributions to PRAs would be mandatory
and, in many cases, would raise business costs, these
contributions should not be considered taxes because
no revenue is received by any government agency and
the funds are personally owned and privately invested.
CED acknowledges that the requirement for compul-
sory savings will be difficult for workers at the lowest
income levels. However, the alternatives of increased
payroll tax rates while still employed or inadequate
benefits while retired would be totally unacceptable. 
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CONCLUSION
Thus, the CED plan would create a two-tier sys-tem: (1) a fiscally balanced basic benefit—thatis, the present “defined benefit” program with
spending growth cut sufficiently to make the system
sustainable; and (2) a new “defined contribution” pro-
gram that would involve mandatory contributions to
PRAs. If this two-tier system is enacted promptly, the
economic safety net now provided by Social Security
can be preserved without overburdening future work-
ers. The economic well being of low-income retirees
would be protected because most of the benefit reduc-
tions in the current system (though not the increase in
the retirement age) would be limited to middle- and
upper-income participants. PRAs, which would pro-
vide an additional source of retirement income for all
retirees, would be particularly valuable for those whose
benefits from the defined benefit system are cut.
Intergenerational equity would be improved by
increasing the importance of benefits derived from a
funded system, and by offering an opportunity for
younger people to receive adequate investment returns
on their contributions. This CED plan provides a
retirement saving program for workers not covered by
a retirement plan, including part-time and contingent
workers who frequently do not have access to private
retirement programs.
Finally, and importantly, the CED program would gen-
erate a substantial increase in national saving that
would help to boost long-term economic growth and
thereby make it easier for the nation to support the
growing elderly population. Without such reform, the
nation will confront the very unpleasant choice of a
substantial reduction in the economic status of the eld-
erly or an economically damaging and unfair burden
on future generations of workers. In contrast, most of
the proposals for converting Social Security to a priva-
tized pension pay for at least a part of the transition
costs by increased federal borrowing. With deficits
already too large and the beginning of the retirement of
the baby-boom generation just three years away, such a
strategy would seem risky in the extreme.
In sum, CED’s approach to Social Security reform
would seem more in tune with widely accepted princi-
ples of social cohesion and fiscal prudence. We urge
policymakers to consider this alternative. ■
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